Rethinking the Problem of Postcolonialism

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Like all other "post"-marked terms, "postcolonialism" has caused no end of debate among its protagonists and antagonists. While the authors of *The Empire Writes Back* champion a loose use of the term "postcolonial" in expanding it to the literatures of Canada, Australia, and the United States, Simon During defines "postcolonialism" as "the need, in nations or groups which have been victims of imperialism, to achieve an identity uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images." However, critics like Linda Hutcheon, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha are unmistakably skeptical of the possibility of an "uncontaminated" or "indigenous" postcolonial theory. Hutcheon argues that "the entire post-colonial project usually posits precisely the impossibility of that identity ever being 'uncontaminated,'" for postcolonialism designates a subversive discourse within the dominant Eurocentric culture rather than outside it. Spivak advocates the catachrestic strategy of "reversing, displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding" instead of constructing indigenous theories by ignoring the last few centuries of historical involvement. Differing from other postcolonial critics, Bhabha shifts focus from the colonized/colonizer confrontation to a third space beyond the binary structure. In relaunching Derridean *differance* on postcolonial terrain, he provides a narrative scheme for analyzing the hitherto neglected grey, ambiguous space of culture, renaming the colonial subject and colonial discourse in terms of the in-between, and more importantly, turning the indeterminacy of colonial discourse into an agency of counterhegemonic resistance.

While these critics, despite their divergences, all agree to use the term "postcolonial" for designating the subaltern consciousness and praxis, critics such as Ella Shohat, Anne McClintock, and Arif Dirlik fault the term for glossing over contemporary global power relations. McClintock objects to the term "postcolonial" for its premature celebration of the pastness of colonialism, and to her, part of the reason for the curious ubiquity of the term is its academic marketability, for it sounds more palatable to the authorities of universities than "third-world studies," or "studies in neo-colonialism" (AP 93). In Dirlik's estimate, postcolonialism is a progeny of postmodernism, and...
postcolonial critics' most original contributions consist in their rephrasing of older problems of Third-Worldism in the language of poststructuralism, but they have deliberately avoided examining the relationship between postcolonialism and global capitalism. While giving postcolonial critics full credit for engaging “in valid criticism of past forms of ideological hegemony,” Dirlik takes them to task for their complicity in covering up “contemporary problems of social, political, and cultural domination.” Shohat takes issue with the term “postcolonial” for its implication that “colonialism is now a matter of the past,” which inadvertently conceals the fact that global hegemony persists in forms other than overt colonial rule. In her rigorous interrogation of postcolonialism both as a term and as an emergent discourse, Shohat addresses the problems of its origin, contradictions, and political failures. From her point of view, the term “postcolonial” fails to address the issue of contemporary power relations; it lacks a political content which can account for U.S. imperialism in the eighties and nineties (NP 105). Despite differences and contradictions among and within Third-World countries, Shohat prefers the term “Third World,” for it contains a common project of allied resistances to neocolonialisms, “usefully evoking structural commonalities of struggles among diverse peoples” (NP 111). In her assessment, the term “postcolonial” would be more precise if it were “articulated as a ‘post-First/Third Worlds theory’ or ‘post-anti-colonial critique,’ as a movement beyond a relatively binaristic fixed and stable mapping of power relations between ‘colonized/colonizer’ and ‘center/periphery’” (NP 107–8).

These critics reject the term “postcolonial” primarily for its dismaying implication of “after the demise of colonialism.” Their objections to the concept of postcoloniality arise from the recognition of the increasing presence of neocolonialism. To these critics, it is a logical impossibility to assign postcolonialism and neocolonialism to the same temporality. But, ironically, their arguments contain a boomeranging consequence that will ultimately undermine their own positions, for they fail to see that neocolonialism, as I will demonstrate, is the condition of possibility of postcolonialism, which can be articulated as a neo-Gramscian counterdiscourse in the age of hegemonic imperialism. Postcolonial criticism, as Gyan Prakash points out, “force[s] a radical rethinking and re-formulation of forms of knowledge and social identities authored and authorized by colonialism and western domination.” In this sense, the postcolonial “exists as an aftermath, an after—after being worked over by colonialism” (PC 8). Emerging in a world embedded in colonial forms of knowledge, the postcolonial designates a moment within colonialism and beyond it. Postcoloniality points to a world that has
done with what Abdul JanMohamed terms the “dominant phase of colonialism” and yet is caught up in what he calls the “hegemonic phase of colonialism.” It is the historical need to deconstruct residues of older colonialism and withstand neocolonialism that, I will argue, gives rise to postcolonialism, which shifts the battlefield from the political and military onto the cultural terrain. In response to those objections to the legitimacy of postcolonialism, I will also argue that postcolonialism designates an anxiety to move beyond Eurocentric ideology, beyond colonialist binary structures of self/Other, and ultimately beyond any form of racism. The postcolonial shares some of postmodernism’s fundamental assumptions, but it is misleading to reduce postcolonialism to a mere function of postmodernism. If the contemporary neocolonialist hegemony is, as JanMohamed succinctly points out, based on the active direct consent of the dominated, then it is also arguable that the neocolonized are guilty of complicity in consolidating neocolonialism. Therefore, the postcolonial counterhegemonic project urges the postcolonial intellectuals of neocolonized countries to interrogate and dismantle thoroughly imperialist forms of knowledge ingrained in their own political and cultural unconscious as well as inscribed in Western representations of the non-Western.

As Prakash notes, postcolonial discourse benefits tremendously from Derrida’s and Foucault’s deconstructive readings of Western thought, which provide “a powerful critique of the rule of modernity that the colonies experienced in a peculiar form” (PC 10). This is true and partly explains why critics like Dirlik share the assumption that postcolonialism is a progeny of postmodernism. But, despite postcolonialism’s indebtedness to postmodernism, it is dangerous to regard postcolonialism as a mere figure of postmodernism. For this position represents a general tendency to turn postcolonialism into a West-centered discourse against West-centered universalism and rationalism. True, postcolonialism owes much of its sophisticated conceptual language to postmodernism, but it emerges as a distinct discourse with a set of problematics different from those of postmodernism. Postcolonialism is first of all a counterdiscourse of the formerly colonized Others against the cultural hegemony of the modern West with all its imperial structures of feeling and knowledge, whereas postmodernism is primarily a counterdiscourse against modernism that emerges within modernism itself. Postmodernism, while rigorously challenging the fundamental assumptions of Truth, Order, sign, and subjectivity institutionalized since Plato and sublimated by modernism, tends to universalize its own problematics. Postcolonialism historicizes postmodern thematics, deploying postmodern arguments in the service of decentering world history as well as vindicating and asserting the identities of the formerly colonized. Therefore, to identify
postcolonialism as a function of postmodernism is to cancel the difference between postcolonialism and postmodernism, to universalize the problematics of postmodernism, and ultimately to ignore the uneven development of history. As Kumkum Sangari points out, “the postmodern preoccupation with the crisis of meaning is not everyone’s crisis” and different peoples have different “modes of de-essentialization.” There are “a wide variety of subjects today” including the postcolonial or postcolonized that “do not fit the postmodern categories.” It is urgent to reconstruct subjectivity for a postcolonial cultural politics in a historical situation in which both subjects and objects have been dissolved. It is also pertinent to ask how to recuperate and respect postcolonial subject positions in the formerly colonized and semi-colonized spaces. In order to undo the colonial contamination, those marginalized Others need to have “distinct political agendas and a theory of agency,” which postmodernism threatens to cancel (CD 168). In this sense, postcolonialism signifies an attempt by the formerly colonized to reevaluate, rediscover, and reconstruct their own cultures. It is also an act of rethinking the history of the world against the inadequacy of the terms and conceptual frames invented by the West.

The term “postcolonial” began to be used to replace “Third World” in the 1980s, but it is not justifiable to reverse this trend. For the term “postcolonial” has been used to supersede “Third World” at a time of crisis for the three-world theory. The replacement of “Third World” by “postcolonial” seems to be justified not only by the fact that there is “no such thing as Third World [culture] as an internally coherent object of theoretical knowledge,” but also by a radical reconfiguration of global power relations and the need for a radically different narrativization of history. There is no doubt that the use of “Third World” recalls the anticolonialist decades when the colonized, “gun in hand,” struggled with the colonizers for freedom. After the term “Third World” was used for the first time at the 1955 Bandung Conference, it quickly gained international currency in both academic and political realms, and particularly in reference to anticolonial nationalist movements of the fifties through the seventies. However, the Third-World nationalist struggle as such no longer provides an effective framework for analyzing the confrontation between the colonized and the colonizer of the eighties and nineties. Anticolonialism was primarily a nationalist movement for political and economic independence. Since the heyday of anticolonialism, nation-states have emerged in former colonized spaces, and “the imperial structure has been dismantled in political terms.” But, as many critics have pointed out, “formal independence for colonized countries has rarely meant the end of the First World’s hegemony” (NP 104); rather, Westerners, after their withdrawal from
these countries, “continued to rule [there] morally and intellectually.”16 In other words, these formerly colonized countries are confronting neocolonialist invasions. Neocolonialism emerges as a regeneration of colonialism through hegemonizing Western economy, technology, and ideology. With its economic and technological superiority, Western culture is penetrating the Third World or precapitalist spaces with its “entire system of values, attitudes, morality, institutions, and more important, mode of production” (EM 62). If European colonialists have destroyed the native mode of production in these precapitalist areas, disrupting their native social relations of production with capitalist social relations and values, then neocolonialist invasions are likewise creating new, unforeseen sociopolitical chaos and unrest there. This fact well accounts for the general sense of disillusionment in nationalism in those countries.

Furthermore, there is no longer a “Second World” because of the disintegration of the socialist bloc of Eastern Europe. If the Western capital and technology are colonizing the world on a global scale, then the colonized should include the former Second World as well. Actually, because of the increasing influx of immigrants into the Western countries and the invasion of multinational capital into the former Third-World countries, we can now simultaneously witness the local Third-Worlding of the First World and the local First-Worlding of the Third World. Indeed, global power relations have recently undergone fundamental changes: namely, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union as a political and military superpower; the rise of Japan as an economic superpower; the emergence of the four tigers of East and Southeast Asia; the economic invasion of the previous Third-World countries and areas in the form of multinational capital from the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe.

This is the moment of neocolonialism, which is the cultural logic of multinational capital. As Fredric Jameson points out, multinational capitalism, characterized by the International Monetary Fund in development and the Green Revolution in agriculture, designates a neocolonialism which “transforms its relationship to its colonies from an old-fashioned imperialist control to market penetration, destroying the older village communities and creating a whole new wage-labor pool and lumpenproletariat.”17 Jameson’s “neocolonialism” finds a different name in JanMohamed’s “hegemonic phase of colonialism,” which begins at the end of what he calls the “dominant phase” of colonialism. “Throughout the dominant phase,” JanMohamed remarks, “which spans the period from the earliest European conquest to the moment at which a colony is granted ‘independence,’ European colonizers exercise direct and continuous bureaucratic control and military coercion of the
natives" (EM 61). In contrast, imperialism in its hegemonic phase depends largely on the “active and direct ‘consent’ of the dominated, though, of course, the threat of military coercion is always in the background” (EM 62). If JanMohamed’s theory of the two phases of imperialism holds true historically, then subaltern resistance to hegemonic imperialism must be different from resistance to dominant imperialism. Without question the former Third-World nationalist political agenda no longer obtains when newly emergent nation-states are being subjugated with their own consent, and it is in this sense that we cannot replace “postcolonial” again with “Third World.” Moreover, to the same extent to which late capitalism has invented more sophisticated strategies of containment to repress oppositional culture, neocolonialism in the form of economic and technological revolution possesses unprecedented capacity to conquer the precapitalist space more easily and thoroughly. Never before has Western imperialism been so successful in infiltrating and consolidating European-American master narratives of history; never before has the majority of Western society been so unanimously bound together by the structure of feeling that, to borrow terms from Said, “we are number one, we are bound to lead, we stand for freedom and order, and so on” (CI xvii); and never before have the non-Western countries been so awe-stricken by the sense of the Western world’s superiority in technology and economy. Hegemonic neocolonialism is reproducing Eurocentric ideology both through multinational capital and through the complicity of the non-Western in their uncritical acceptance of Western culture.

Perhaps this neocolonialism can be best seen through the lens of the Chinese 1980s and 1990s. Since the beginning of the eighties, multinational capital and postmodernist culture have made significant headway into the forbidden combined space of the Asiatic mode of production and communist ideology. The economic structure and cultural production in China are increasingly commodified; the Green Revolution is taking place, and new ideas and social relations are reaching into the farthest rural areas. American dollars, televisions, refrigerators, and video machines enter rural as well as urban households. With fresh memories of material poverty and political sufferings in the past, people are vying with one another for oblivious immersion in the immediate present of hedonistic materialism—the Chinese version of what Jameson calls reversed millenarianism. At the same time, postmodernism finds lugubrious expression in popular culture: saturating the market of mass culture are Rock-n-Roll, Karaoke, gongfu movies or videotapes, mysteries and best-sellers, and various forms of pastiche, parasitical on previous and Western cultures. For a few years, terms of cybernetics, structural-
ism, Freudianism, Nietzsche, psychoanalysis, and deconstruction almost became the signs of intellectual marketability. The recent disengagement from the traditional ideology and the crisis in traditional values prompts people to accept blindly "Western" ideas and values without second thought, as if everything Western were superior. All this neocolonialist penetration of China cannot be properly grasped except in historical context. This is the second time the Chinese have experienced a general crisis of national identity in the twentieth century.

China became part of Western power relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since then the issue of modernization has kept coming back to every responsible Chinese intellectual. With a complex feeling of fear of and admiration for the Western Other, the Chinese started to learn from their Western masters with a view to appropriating Western cultural, technological, and ideological forms. The May Fourth intellectuals, following their predecessors like Tan Citong and Sun Yat-sen, became the most radical vanguards against feudalism; they relentlessly critiqued their traditional culture, believing that a thorough revolution in culture was necessary in order to modernize China to equal Western powers. To this generation of intellectuals, Europe was the exemplar of modern civilization, and "to be modern," to borrow terms from Albert Hourani, "was to have a political and social life similar to those of the countries of western Europe."

Such Eurocentric anxieties for modernization are best reflected in the attempted wholesale repudiation of Confucianism and in the belief in Western science and democracy (Sai and De) as the surest way to a rejuvenated and reconstructed China that would someday rank among the great powers of the world. That was a time of utopian creativity, a time of anxieties and enthusiasm for revolution, but also a time of naivete and confusion, a time of unthinkingly making causal connections between historical events and aspects of social life. Despite their divergent political ideals and strategies, those earlier progressive Chinese intellectuals all had for their ultimate goal national independence and prosperity against the threat of Western powers. But, ironically, most of them uncritically subscribed to Eurocentric historicism and Western ideas of modernity. Such premature celebration of Western modernity finds a distant but unmistakable echo in the eighties, the time of the "River Elegy Phenomenon." Su Xiaokan, the author of River Elegy, and his modernist or modernizationist colleagues, declare, in the disturbing historical narrative River Elegy, that the Yellow Civilization (the Asiatic mode of production) has been defeated and must be superseded by the Blue or Oceanic Civilization (the Western industrial revolution). This is not the voice of a few individuals, but a collective manifesto of
modernization. The River Elegy phenomenon shows the world how decidedly Chinese intellectuals today remain imprisoned in Eurocentric ideology and the Western master narrative of history. To the River Elegy authors as well as their May Fourth predecessors, the world has only one history, one version of modernity.

My point is not merely that the Western master narrative of modernity retains its grip on the world, but also that non-Western peoples including the Chinese, to a large extent, remain ideologically and culturally colonized without political and military coercion by imperialists. Nationalist struggles seem to have failed to redeem the natives from imperialist clutches; the passage of the last few centuries has not shattered the Eurocentric historicism that was initially established in the Enlightenment and consolidated by Europe’s technological and military superiority through the nineteenth century. As Dipesh Chakrabarty insightfully points out, the Western world today “remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories” including those of Third-World countries.19 It is such formidably sustained dominance of Eurocentric historicism that compels Chakrabarty to pose the pungent question: “The everyday paradox of third-world social science is that we find these theories, in spite of their inherent ignorance of ‘us,’ eminently useful in understanding our societies. What allowed the modern European sages to develop such clairvoyance with regard to societies of which they were empirically ignorant? Why cannot we, once again, return the gaze?” (PA 3). There is an obvious self-critical tone in these remarks, which urge us to address the problem of non-Western peoples’ complicity in the propagation of neocolonialist values and ideas. In a 1985 panel discussion on the intellectual in the postcolonial world, Conor Cruise O’Brien and Edward Said complained about their African and Middle East colleagues’ passivity and indifference to counterhegemonic struggle. O’Brien says that in the African countries he has visited, his academic colleagues seem to show no interest in interrogating colonial residues and neocolonialism.20 Said recalls that, while visiting a national university in one of the Persian Gulf states in 1985, he was “flabbergasted” to discover that English literature courses were rigorously orthodox, and that young Arabs in Arab universities were dutifully reading Milton, Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Austen, and Dickens as if there were no connection between English and the colonial processes that brought the language and its literature to the Arab world (CI 305). All this indicates that many Third-World intellectuals do not seem to be willing to return the gaze, and that they do not appear to be concerned with transcending or going beyond coloniality. It also indicates that orientals’ occidentalism contributes to Eurocentrism as much as Westerners’ orientalism.

This is the historical context for the emergence of postcolonialism
with its counterhegemonic task. Its purpose is to critique and dismantle Eurocentric forms of knowledge and structures of feeling located on both sides of the neocolonialist divide. It can be articulated as the agency of counterhegemonic resistance where older forms of anticolonialism have failed. For postcolonialism represents an urgent need and determination to dismantle imperial structures in the realm of culture. The postcolonial does not signify the demise or pastness of coloniality; rather, it points to a colonial past that remains to be interrogated and critiqued. It admits an indebtedness to the past and a responsibility to the future; it intends to clear the ground of older colonialism in order to resist neocolonialism. It is more formal and symbolic yet more thorough and subversive in addressing colonialism than anticolonialism has been. Cultural forms, as Said says, “were immensely important in the formation of imperial attitudes, references, and experiences” (Cf xii), and it takes a much more arduous and protracted project to investigate and undo the imperial structures underpinning cultural productions. For colonialism has been an inherent, enabling part of Western civilization, and many Western masters of thought and many masterpieces of literature have been guilty of being instrumental to colonialism and racism. As Richard Waswo points out, European colonialism owes its very origin to the Aeneid, a work that has been recited throughout history to justify Western maneuvers to displace or destroy primitive and savage populations in the name of civilization, which has always been believed to come from the West.21 Over the last few centuries, “the racist taxonomy of humankind came to play a major role in the ways in which Europeans came to view the world.”22 It is no exaggeration to say that the emergence of modernity in Europe has been the emergence of colonialism and imperialism. For example, the Manichaean distinction between whites and blacks disconcertingly informs the works of such representatives of Enlightenment as Voltaire and Kant; imperialism has been dedicatedly acclaimed and sublimated by such influential intellectuals as Carlyle, Ruskin, and Mill; global expansions of the imperialist venture have met with euphoric celebrations and justifications in literary works of such widely read writers as Jane Austen, Dickens, Kipling, and Conrad. The most dismaying irony is that all these writers have been and are still enthusiastically studied as canonical figures in the disciplines of philosophy, history, and literature in non-Western as well as Western countries.

If the history of the world has been a colonialist process of the dissemination of Western civilization, and if the non-Western world is still ruled by the Western world morally and intellectually, then postcolonial discourse has to assume the form of a neo-Gramscian Long March in the realm of culture. This is not merely because culture has
always been a field of anticolonial struggle, but more importantly, in the age of hegemonic imperialism, culture has become the privileged and even the only field of counterhegemonic struggle. What Richard Terdiman writes about the contestation of hegemony in a different context will shed light on the point I am trying to make here, although he is primarily concerned with the discourse and counterdiscourse in Europe. The social control exercised by the dominant class, Terdiman declares in *Discourse/Counter-Discourse*, has passed from the stage of rule to that of hegemony (Gramsci), or from repressive to ideological apparatuses (Althusser). Accordingly, the discourse of contestation nowadays has become more formal or symbolic. What Terdiman writes about the cultural counterhegemony in the nineteenth century is pertinent to the present discussion: “The blockage of energy directed to structural change of the social formation is an important condition of possibility for the *textual* revolution in which the intelligentsia reinvested some of the dynamism of that sociohistorical revolution which never occurred” (*DC* 80). The “textual revolution” as defined by Terdiman can be taken to prefigure the postcolonial cultural revolution as well. Just as the blocked energy directed toward social transformation in nineteenth-century Europe gave rise to a textual revolution, so the neocolonial hegemony emerging upon the fall of older colonialism calls postcolonial counterhegemony into being. The postcolonialist “textual revolution” is not yet a full-fledged discourse; it is still in its incipient phase. It cannot hope to stop multinational capital from invading former Third-World countries, nor is it able to stop the United States’ political and military as well as economic interventions in Latin America and the Persian Gulf, but it can go a long way toward dismantling the Eurocentric ideology underpinning the past and contemporary work of culture.

The postcolonial textual revolution urges a relentless interrogating of the underside of Western culture, undertaking to investigate Eurocentric imperialist forms of knowledge and perceptions on both sides of the imperialist divide. On the one hand, the postcolonial critic should rigorously critique the unabashedly Eurocentric views of the non-Western world featured in the texts of Conrad, Kipling, Graham Greene, and Robert Stone, and the ideas about colonial expansion and inferior races embraced by writers such as Carlyle, Ruskin, Austen, Dickens, and Thackeray. On the other hand, the postcolonial critic must expose and dismantle the Eurocentric ideas ingrained in the minds of indigenous peoples. “The *post-* in postcolonial,” to quote Kwame Anthony Appiah, “is the *post-* of space-clearing gesture.” To clear the cultural space of the world after it has been worked over by colonialism is to move beyond Eurocentric historicism, beyond imperialist polarities of self/Other, center/periphery, metropolis/country, and modern/traditional. In this
sense, postcolonialism is the exemplary counterhegemonic discourse at a time when imperialism and colonialism are displaced from their earlier, crude political and military coercion to cultural and economic hegemony. In a world burdened by a few centuries of coloniality, it is impossible to construct identities and forms of knowledge uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images, but it is possible and necessary to take up a third space of revision, as Homi Bhabha says, to dwell in a "beyond" that is neither the indigenous past nor the colonized present. Bhabha argues in his recent book, The Location of Culture, that "Being in the 'beyond,' then, is to inhabit an intervening space, as any dictionary will tell you. But to dwell 'in the beyond' is also . . . to be part of a revisionary time, a return to the present to redescribe our cultural contemporaneity; to reinscribe our human, historic commonality; to touch the future on its hither side" (LC7). Given the past few centuries of modernity and colonialism, it is out of the question to think and write outside the dominant discourse. The system of modernity with all its ideological trappings has penetrated every space of the world's culture. Thus it may be argued that Bhabha's conception of a revisionary "beyond" provides an effective alternative to the ubiquitous reality of Eurocentric modernity. What happens at the point of contact between the colonizer and the colonized is the emergence of the Third Space of enunciation, the hybrid, ambivalent, in-between space of signification. Just as Derrida adds a third term, the temporal dimension, to the Saussurean sign, so Bhabha constructs a third space, an interstitial locus of meaning, between the indigenous and the European, the colonizer and the colonized. This newly emergent cultural space proves subversive to both the Western and the indigenous, allowing neither of them cultural and discursive continuity. The hegemonic discourse of modernity tends to subjugate all its subjects to its historicist syntax of narrative, molding their consciousness, structuring their feelings and sensory data accordingly. However, the subject of cultural revision, postcolonial and counterhegemonic in nature, threatens to subvert the hierarchical syntax of modernity. For the postcolonial subject to dwell in the colonizing space of modernity is to be positioned on the boundary of modernity, at once within and outside the syntax of hegemonic culture. Bhabha's theory of postcolonial counterhegemony with its revisionary strategy opens up new spaces of reinscription and negotiation not only for resistance to present forms of imperialism, but for struggle against future forms of imperialism as well. Indeed, the world has witnessed many racisms and ethnocentrisms other than Eurocentric racism, although this has been the most dominant. If the history of the world is a rich documentation of empires and imperialisms, if ethnocentrism is a closet monster in every ethnic
community and individual, and if there is racial confrontation within indigenous nations as well as between the indigenous and the Western colonizer, the postcolonial counterhegemonic project will indeed go a long way toward interrogating and disintegrating any form of imperialism.

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NOTES

2 Linda Hutcheon, “Circling the Downspout of Empire,” in Past the Last Post: Theorizing Postcolonialism and Postmodernism, ed. Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin (Calgary, 1990), p. 183; hereafter cited in text as CD.
5 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, 1994), pp. 171–97; hereafter cited in text as LC.
8 Ella Shohat, “Notes on the ‘Postcolonial,’” Social Text, 31/32 (1992), 105; hereafter cited in text as NP.
9 Gyan Prakash, “Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography,” Social Text, 31/32 (1992), 8; hereafter cited in text as PC.
14 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, tr. Constance Farrington (New York, 1963), p. 46.
